



g1 = g4 - E(Ip | e00) ≥ 0 
g2 = g4 - E(Ip | e11) ≥ 0 
g3 = g4 - E(Ip | e01) ≥ 0 
g4 = E(Ip | e10) ≥ 0 
 
As for the costs Cbp of effort, we define23: 
(32) Cbp(ebp) =    
0                  if    e00                    
Cbp               if    e11
Cbp – Cp        if    e10  
Cbp – Cb       if    e01. 
Also here Cbp is constant, as Cb and Cp. 
 
6. Comparison of the two contracts in the electoral period. 
We have seen that in the election period, if the politician appoints two agents, his expected utility is: 
E(U-u | e10) = H – H0. 
On the other hand, the utility expected by the politician, when he entrusts the task to a single agent 
is  
     (1)’     E(U-u | e10) = H – H0’ 
To prove that in the electoral period it is to the politician’s advantage to give the two tasks to a 
single agent - for an appropriate allocation of the size of incentive payments Tij, compatible with 
the constraints (C1)(see appendix C.) gk ≥ 0 for k = 1,2,3,4 - one needs to show that it is possible to 
have   
H0’ ≤ H0.  
                                                 
23 For the problem of constrained optimization see appendix C.). 
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Let us suppose that the politician rewards the central banker, by paying him the same amount set for 
the banking authority under conditions of banking stability24, provided he makes an effort to 
achieve both banking stability and price instability. He will be punished, however, in all other cases.  
So if we put: 
T10 = Tb = Cb (1- P3b) / (P1b – P3b) and  
T11 = T01 = T00 = tb = -Cb P3b / (P1b – P3b),  
we get  
2 H0 = (Tb2 + tb2) P1b – tb2, 
while 
2 H0’ = (Tb2 + tb2) P1b (1 – P3p) – tb2  
and the result is therefore H0’ < H0, as was foreseen. 
For this result to be valid, the allocation considered needs to be compatible with the constraints  
gk ≥ 0 given by (C1)(see in appendix C.). Let us check it. 
With the incentive payments considered, the result is: 
g1 ≥ 0  equivalent to Cb (1- P3b) + Cp ≥ Cbp  
g2 ≥ 0  equivalent to  Cb [P1b (1-P3p) – P2b (1 – P1p)] / (P1b – P3b)  + Cp ≥ 0 . 
From conditions (2)’ and (3)’ it follows that the expression in square brackets is positive and, 
therefore, the previous inequality is always true. 
g3 ≥ 0  equivalent to   Cb [P1b (1 - P3p) – P0b (1 – P1p)] / (P1b – P3b)  + Cp – Cb ≥ 0. 
For the same reasons as before,  the expression in square brackets is proved to be positive and, 
therefore, if Cb ≤ Cp the third constraint is also shown to be valid.  
g4 ≥ 0  equivalent to  Cb [P1b (1 - P3p) – P3b]  ≥ (Cbp – Cp) (P1b – P3b) 
which can also be written  
     Cbp ≤ Cp + Cb [1 - P1b P3p / (P1b – P3b) ] 
and is likely to be P1b P3p / (P1b – P3b) ≤ 1, if P3b is small enough compared to P1b. 
                                                 
24 This hypothesis fits in with the idea that there are economies of scope (cbp < cb + cp), which emerges from the model.  
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We can therefore conclude that the choice of incentive payments is compatible with the constraints 
if: 
Cbp ≤ Cp + Cb           i.e. if there are economies of scope; 
Cb ≤ Cp                   if the task of the central bank is more demanding (this is clear if one thinks of  
                                the fact that the central bank is also responsible for banking stability as lender  
                                of last resort);  
P3b < P1b                  it is natural to expect this given the definition of these probabilities (in other   
                                 words it is normal to expect that it is easier to achieve banking stability if the  
                                 authority responsible makes an effort in this direction). 
In these cases, in the election period it is to the politician’s advantage to appoint a single agent for 
the two roles. 
 
7. Contract with a single agent in the non-electoral period. 
 In the post-electoral period, government authorities will want to contain the negative effects, in 
terms of inflation, deriving from the non-socially beneficial decisions  taken, during the election 
period, to maximize the probability of re-election. 
For this reason in the non-electoral period the politician will prefer price stability and stability in the 
banking system. He will therefore offer the CB the following payments 
T11          if                E1 =  Bs∩Ps 
T10           “                E2 =  Bs∩-Ps 
T01           “                E3 = -Bs∩Ps 
T00           “                E4 = -Bs∩-Ps 
with (presumably)   
(33) T11 ≥ T10 ,  T01 ≥ T00 . 
The politician’s expected net utility in the non-electoral period will be: 
                E(U-u | e11) =  H’ – K’ 
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